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If SCi ≥SCj , we call SCi as the predecessor of SCj and
SCj as the successor of SCi. If SCi ≥ SCk ≥ SCj ,then SCk
is an intermediate security class. In this case SCk is the
predecessor of SCj and SCi is the predecessor of SCk. In
a user hierarchy, the encrypted message by a successor
security class is only decrypted by that successor class as
well as its all predecessor security classes in that
hierarchy. Akl and Taylor [1] first developed the
cryptographic key assignment scheme in an arbitrary
partial order set (poset) hierarchy. MacKinnon et al. [11]
presented an optimal algorithm, called the canonical
assignment,to reduce the value of public parameters.
Harn and Lin [6] then proposed a bottom up key
generating scheme,instead of using a top-down approach
as in the Akl and Taylor scheme and MacKinnon et al.’s
scheme. In order to solve dynamic access control
problems, many schemes have been proposed in the
literature[10], [7], [9], [16], [3], [13], [14], [4]. Chang et
al. [3] proposed a key assignment scheme based on
Newton’s interpolation method and one-way hash
function. In their scheme, a user with higher security
clearance must iteratively perform the key derivation
process for deriving the secret key of a user who is not
an immediate successor. Other proposed schemes [16],
[14] enhance Akl and Taylor’s scheme [1], and explore
other possible approaches that can enable a user in a
hierarchy to modify the secret key as and when
necessary. Thus,a predecessor can directly and
efficiently derive the secret keys of its successor(s). Kuo
et al. later developed a method [9] that employs the
public key to encrypt the secret key. Their scheme has a
straightforward key assignment algorithm, small storage
space requirement, and uses a one-way hash function. In
2006, Jeng-Wang proposed an efficient key management
and derivation scheme based on the elliptic curve
cryptosystem. An attractive advantage of their scheme is
that it solves dynamic key management efficiently and
flexibly. However, we show that their scheme is
vulnerable to dynamic exterior attack.
In this paper, we propose our dynamic exterior
attack on Jeng-Wang scheme to show that their scheme

Abstract
In a key management scheme for hierarchy based access
control, each security class having higher clearance can derive
the cryptographic secret keys of its other security classes
having lower clearances. In 2006 Jeng-Wang proposed an
efficient scheme on access control in user hierarchy based on
elliptic curve cryptosystem. Their scheme provides solution of
key management efficiently for dynamic access problems.
However, in this paper, we propose an attack on Jeng-Wang
scheme to show that Jeng-Wang scheme is insecure against
our proposed attack. We show that in our proposed attack, an
attacker (adversary) who is not a user in any security class in a
user hierarchy attempts to derive the secret key of a security
class .
Key Words: Key management, Elliptic curve, Hierarchical
Access control, Security, Dynamic Exterior attacks.

1.

Introduction

Hierarchical access control is a fundamental problem in
computer and network systems. In a hierarchical access
control, a user of higher security level class has the
ability to access information items (such as message,
data, files, etc.) of other users of lower security classes.
A user hierarchy consists of a number n of disjoint
security classes, say, SC1, SC2, . . ., , SCn. Let this set be
SC = {SC1, SC2, . . . , SCn}. A binary partially ordered
relation ≥ is defined in SC as SCi≥ SCj , which means
that the security class SCi has a security clearance higher
than or equal to the security class SCj . In addition the
relation ≥ ， satisfies the following properties:
(a) [Reflexive property] SCi ≥ SCi SCi Є SC.
(b) [Anti-symmetric property] If SCi, SCj Є SC
such that SCi≥ SCj and SCj ≥SCi, then SCi = SCj
.
(c) [Transitive property] If SCi, SCj , SCk Є SC
such that SCi ≥SCj and SCj ≥ SCk, then SCi≥
SCk.
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is vulnerable under the proposed attack. The rest of this
paper is sketched as follows. In Section 2, we review
some mathematical backgrounds which are useful to
review Jeng-Wang scheme. We then give briefly an
overview of Jeng-Wang scheme [4] in Section 3. In
Section 4, we describe our proposed dynamic exterior
attack on Jeng-Wang scheme [4]. Finally, we conclude
the paper in Section 5.
2.

. The field size
is considered as a large
,
whose
prime. We take
as the base point on
order is , that is,
.
The elliptic curve addition differs from the general
and
be two
addition [8]. Let
,
,
points on elliptic curve
,
is computed
,
with
, then
as follows:

Mathematical backgrounds

In this section, we discuss the elliptic curve and its
properties. We then discuss the rules for adding points
on elliptic curve and the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem. We, finally, discuss the properties of a oneway hash function.

,
,
,
In elliptic curve cryptography, multiplication is defined
, ,
as repeated additions. For example, if
then 6 is computed as 6
.

2.1 Elliptic Curve over Finite Field
and
, where
0,1, … . ,
1 and
3 be a prime, such that 4
27
0
.
A non-singular elliptic curve
over the
,
of solutions
finite field
is the set
to the congruence:
,
,
are constants such that 4
where
and
27
0
, together with a special point
called the point at infinity or zero point.
The condition 4
27
0
is the
necessary and sufficient to ensure that the equation
0 has a non-singular solution [12]. If
4
27
0
, then
the
corresponding
elliptic curve is called a singular elliptic curve. If
,
and
,
be points in
, ,
and
.
then
implies that
Also
,
, for all
, .
Moreover, an elliptic curve
,
over
has
roughly
points on it. More precisely, a well-known
theorem due to Hasse asserts that the number of points
, , which is denoted by # , satisfies the
on
following inequality [15]:
p 1 2 p #E p 1 2 p.
In addition,
,
forms an abelian group or
commutative group under addition modulo operation.
Let

2.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem
The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is as follows:
given an element in a finite group whose order is ,
that is,
| | and another element
, find an
. It is relatively
integer
such that
easy to calculate discrete exponentiation
given ,
, but it is computationally infeasible to
determine given ,
, when is large.
2.3 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
,
be an elliptic curve modulo a prime .
Let
,
and
, ,
Given two points
for some positive integer .
represents the point
,
is added to itself
times.
on elliptic curve
The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP)
is to determine
given
and . It is relatively easy to
calculate
given
and , but it is computationally
infeasible to determine
given
and , when the
prime is large.
2.4 One-way Hash Function
0,1
takes an
A one-way hash function : 0,1
arbitrary-length input
0,1 , and produces a fixedlength (say, -bits) output
0,1 , called the
message digest. The hash function is the fingerprint of a
file, a message, or other data blocks, and has the
following attributes [15].
1.
can be applied to a data block of all sizes.

2.1.1 Addition of Points on Elliptic Curve over Finite
Field
We take an elliptic curve over a finite filed
,
:
, where

as
and
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2. For any given variable ,
is easy to
operate, enabling easy implementation in
software and hardware.
3. The output length of
is fixed.
4. Deriving from the given value
and
the given hash function . is computationally
infeasible.
5. For any given variable , finding any
so
that
is computationally infeasible.
6. Finding a pair of inputs , ,
, , so that
is computationally infeasible.

ExampleFigure-1 shown SC1 determines its own secret key K1,
and its secret parameter n1, and then generates its public
parameter P1 = n1 G. Then it sends its pair of points kG,
(K1,n1) + kPca} to CA. The other classes in the hierarchy
do the same job. While CA derives all the secret keys
and secret parameters, he constructs the corresponding
polynomials for each class and then makes them public.
The polynomials are generated as follows:

3 Overview
3.1 Key generation algorithm
Step 1. Suppose there are m, m Є N, security classes in
a user hierarchy over the partial-order relation(≤). CA
determines an elliptic group Ep(a,b) as y2 = x3 + ax + b
(mod p), where p is a large prime number, and the
coefficients satisfy 4a3 + 27b2 ≠ 0 (mod p). Then CA
selects a base point G = (x,y) from Ep(a,b) whose order
is a very large value n such that nG = O. CA makes
Ep(a,b), G and the value n public.

Figure-1
H1(x)=nil, which means no other class has access to SC1.
H2(x)=(x- Ã(n2P1)+k2.
H3(x)=(x- Ã(n3P1)+k3.
H4(x)=(x- Ã(n4 P2))(x- Ã(n4 P1))+k4
H5(x)=(x- Ã(n5 P2 ))(x- Ã(n5 P3))(x- Ã(n5P1))+k5.
H6(x)=(x- Ã(n6P3))(x- Ã(n6P1))+k6.

Step 2. CA selects an algorithm Ã :( x, y) → v, for
representing a point on Ep(a,b) as a real number v.CA
makes Ã public. CA chooses a secret parameter nca and
makes Pca public, where Pca = ncaG.
Step 3. For security class SCi,1≤ i≤ m, it chooses its
own secret key Ki, 1 ≤ Ki ≤ p -1, and a secret parameter
ni, ni < n, firstly. It makes Pi public, where Pi = niG.
Then it encrypts the point (Ki,ni) by adding kPca to it and
sends the pair of points {kG, (Ki,ni) + kPca} to CA,
where k is a positive integer selected randomly.

3.2 Key Derivation AlgorithmAssume user ui in the security class SCi wants to access
the encrypted data held by user uj in one of his successor
classes SCj, ui can derive the secret key Kj of uj by the
following steps:

Step 4. For each pair of points {kG, (Ki,ni) + kPca},1 ≤
i≤m, CA multiples the first point by his secret parameter
nca and subtracts the result from the second point to
derive (Ki,ni).

Step 1. Get the public parameters Hj(x) and Pj of uj.
Step 2. Compute Hj(Ã (niPj) and then Kj can be obtained.
Now suppose a user in SC1 wants to derive the secret
key K4. Using his own secret parameter n1 along with the
public parameters H4(x) and P4, he can derive the secret
key K4 by computing H4(Ã (n1P4)shown below.
H4(Ã (n1P4))=( Ã (n1P4- Ã(n4P2))( Ã (n1P4- Ã(n4P1))+k4.
=( Ã (n1P4- Ã(n4P2))( Ã(n1n4G)- Ã(n4n1G))+k4
=k4

(Ki; ni ) + kPca - nca(kG)= (Ki, ni )+ k(ncaG) – nca(kG)=
(Ki, ni)
Step 5. For security class SCi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, CA constructs a
polynomial Hi(x) for him.
Hi(x)=∏ x

A nP

K for all Ci<Ct

3.3 Inserting new security class-
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If a new security class SCa is inserted in to hierarchy
such that SCi≤SCa≤SCj..CA will do following process to
update the partial relationship to manage the accessing
priority when SCa joins the hierarchy.

For pair of points {KG,(K7,n7)+KPca)}, CA multiplies
the first point by his secrete parameter nca and subtracts
the result from the second point to derive (K7,n7)
(K7,n7)+KPca-ncaKG=(k7,n7)
+
K(ncaG)nca(KG)=(K7,n7)

Step-1
For security class SCa, it chooses its own secrete key
Ka,1≤ Ka≤p-1,and a secrete parameter na, n<n.
It makes Pa public, where Pa=naG. Then it encrypts the
point (Ka,na) by adding KPca to it and sends the pair of
points {KG,(Ka, na)+KPca)} to CA , where K is a positive
integer selected randomly.
Step-2
For pair of points {KG,(Ka,na)+KPca)}, CA multiplies
the first point by his secrete parameter nca and subtracts
the result from the second point to derive (Ka,na)

Step-3
For security class SC7, ,CA constructs a polynomial
H7(x) for him
H7(x)= (x- Ã(n7 P1))+k7.
Step-4
Determine the public polynomial H6’(x) by following
equation
H6’(x)=(x- Ã(n6P3))(x- Ã(n6P1))(x- Ã(n6P7))+k6

(Ka,na)+KPca-ncaKG=(ka,na) + K(ncaG)-nca(KG)=(Ka,na)
Step-3
For security class SCa, ,CA constructs a polynomial
Ha(x) for him
Ha(x)= ∏ x Ã n P
ka for all j satisfying
SCa<SCj and j≠a.
Step-4
Determine the public polynomial Hi’(x) by following
equation
Hi’(x)= ∏ x Ã n P
x Ã nP
∏
Where t is performed identical to eq-1 and for
each SCj such that SCi ≤SCa.

Figure-2
3.4 Deleting existing security class phasesSuppose that a security class SCa is to be removed from
a user hierarchy such that the relationship SCi≤SCa≤ SCj
breaks up.

ExampleIt assumes that a new security class SC7 is inserted into
the user hierarchy such
that SC6 ≤ SC7 ≤ SC1 in Fig.2. Afterward
the
information K7,n7,P7,H7(x),H’6(x) will generate the
information by using following steps.
Step-1. For security class SC7, it chooses its own secrete
key K7,1≤ K7≤p-1,and a secrete parameter n7, n7<n.
It makes P7 public, where P7=n7G. Then it encrypts the
point (K7,n7) by adding KPca to it and sends the pair of
points {KG,(K7, n7)+KPca)} to CA , where K is a
positive integer selected randomly.

Figure-3
Suppose there is an existing security class SCa and let it
is to be removed from a user hierarchy, such that the
relationship SCi≤SCa≤SCj breaks up then the
corresponding key Ka and parameter na,Pa are deleted.

Step-2
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The public polynomial Hi(x) for SCi will also be
changed as follows’(x)=∏

.

(

ExampleIt assumes that the existing security class SC3 is removed
from hierarchy as shown in figure-3. So the
corresponding key K3 and the parameter P3,n3 are
deleted. The public polynomial H5(x) will be changed to
H5’(x) and H6(x) will be H6’(6)
Figure-4

H5’(x)=(x- Ã(n5P1))(x- Ã(n5P2))+K5.
H6’(x)=(x- Ã(n6P1))+K6

As
and
are public information, so any one
can obtain that information. Therefore anyone can
from public information by
discover the secrete key
the following equations.

4. On the security of Jeng-Wang SchemeHowever, the WWC-scheme still cannot resist another
case of the exterior attack which is not discussed in [14].
Before we introducing this novel exterior attack, we
must review the result of product
…
by the following theorem:

(2)

…

Theorem 1[2]: The product
can be expanded as follows.
…
Where
, ,…
1,
For instance,
∑

(1)

∑

1

∑

Therefore from equation-1 and equation-2 we can find
out the coefficient of
in
is and the coefficient of
in
is
respectively.
Therefore we can recover the information
by
subtracting coefficient of
from the coefficient of .
Then by putting
in equation-2, we will find out
the secrete key
. Hence this proposed scheme is
insecure when a new security class joins the hierarchy.

,
…

,
…

4.1 Dynamic Exterior Attack
When an illegal user wishes to access the security key
of
through the related public information when a
new class joins the hierarchy.
Consider the example as shown in the figureis formed
4.the public polynomial of
before
joins the hierarchy. After
joins the hierarchy the
public
polynomial

4.2 On the security of removing existing security
classConsider the example as shown in the figure-1, when the
existing security class
is removed from user
of
becomes
hierarchy, the public polynomial
of
and
becomes
, whose
equations are given below.

and
are formed.

(3)
(4)
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(5)

[7] F. G. Jeng and C. M. Wang. An efficient key-management
scheme for hierarchical access control based on elliptic curve
cryptosystem. Journal of Systems and Software, 79(8):1161–
1167, 2006.

(6)

As all above information are public so anyone can get
these information.By dynamic exterior attack, the
attacker can easily obtain
.where
is the coefficient of
in
equation-4 and
is the
coefficient of
in equation-3 respectively. Similarly
the attacker can also obtain
where
and
is the
coefficient of in equation-5.thetefore it is feasible for
and
with
the attacker to obtain the secrete key
knowing the value
and
respectively.
Hence the proposed scheme is insecure when an existing
security class is removed from the hierarchy.

[8] N. Koblitz. Elliptic Curves Cryptosystems. Mathematics of
computation, 48:203–209, 1987.
[9] F. H. Kuo, V. R. L. Shen, T. S. Chen, and F. Lai.
Cryptographic key assignment scheme for dynamic access
control in a user hierarchy. Computers and Digital
Techniques, IEE Proceedings, 146(5):235–240, 1999.
[10] C. H. Lin. Dynamic key management schemes for access
control in a hierarchy. Computer Communications,
20(15):1381–1385, 1997.
[11] S.J. Mackinnon, P.D. Taylor, H. Meijer, and S.G. Akl. An
Optimal Algorithm for Assigning Cryptographic Keys to
Control Access in a Hierarchy. IEEE Transactions on
Computers, 34(9):797–802, 1985.

5 Conclusion

[12] R.W. D. Nickalls. A new approach to solving the cubic:
Cardan’s solution revealed. The Mathematical Gazette,
77(480):354–359, 1993.
[13] V. L. R. Shen and T. S. Chen. A novel key management
scheme based on discrete logarithms and
polynomial
interpolations. Computers & Security, 21(2):164–171, 2002.

In this paper we have shown that an illegal user can find
out the secrete key when a new class joins or an existing
security class is removed from the hierarchy in jengwang scheme.

[14] V. L. R. Shen, T. S. Chen, and F. Lai. Novel
cryptographic key assignment scheme for dynamic access
control in a hierarchy. IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals
of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, E80A(10):2035–2037, 1997.

References
[1] S. G. Akl and P. D. Taylor. Cryptographic solution to a
problem of access control in a hierarchy. ACM Transactions
on Computer Systems (TOCS), 1(3):239–248, 1983.

[15] W. Stallings. Cryptography and Network Security:
Principles and Practices. Prentice Hall, 3rd edition, 2003.

[2]Bruce Schneier “Applied Cryptography” Second edition
Wiley publication

[16] H. M. Tsai and C. C. Chang. A cryptographic
implementation for dynamic access control in a user hierarchy.
Computers & Security, 14(2):159–166, 1995.

[3] C. C. Chang, I. C. Lin, H. M. Tsai, and H. H.Wang. A Key
Assignment Scheme for Controlling Access in Partially
Ordered User Hierarchies. In Proceedings of 18th
International Conference on Advanced Information
Networking and Applications (AINA’04), volume 2, pages 376
– 379, 2004.
[4] Y. F. Chung, H. H. Lee, F. Lai, and T. S. Chen. Access
control in user hierarchy based on elliptic curve cryptosystem.
Information Sciences, 178(1):230–243, 2008.
[5] H. Cohen. A course in computational algebraic number
theory. Springer-Verlag, 1991.
[6] L. Harn and H. Y. Lin. A cryptographic key generation
scheme for multilevel data security. Computers & Security,
9(6):539–546, 1990.

International Journal Communication & Network Security (IJCNS), Volume-I, Issue-II, 2011

55

